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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COLLEEN STOCK RASMUSSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 930642-CA

vs.
JOHN ALAN SHARAPATA,

Priority No. 15

Defendant-Appellee.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from a Judgment of the Fourth Judicial District Court,
The Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge, Presiding
An

UT/

u

r

KEVIN J. SUTTERFIELD and
PHILLIP E. LOWRY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah 84601

5u
DOu\».« N\ i W .

Mmi

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF
-APPELLANT

JEFFREY C. PEATROSS, for:
IVIE & YOUNG
P.O. Box 672
Provo, UT 84603
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE

FIL!
9

Si WWff!

AUG

1 1994

COURT OF APPEA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITffiS

i

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

i

ARGUMENT

1

I. VOIR DIRE AND CHALLENGE OF JUROR BRANSCOMB

1

H. INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICT

3

DJ. PROPRffiTY OF CLOSING ARGUMENT

6

TV. ERROR IN FOUNDATIONAL OBJECTIONS

6

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases cited:
Barrett v. Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985)

1,3
5

Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992) . 1
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991)

6

i

ARGUMENT

Plaintiff-Appellant Colleen Stock Rasmussen ("Stock Rasmussen") here replies to the
response brief of Defendant-Appellee John Alan Sharapata ("Sharapata"). Stock Rasmussen
contends that the delineation of issues and authority supporting those issues is sufficiently stated
in her initial brief. The purpose of this reply brief is to clarify points raised in Sharapata's
response that are misleading or unfounded.

I. VOIR DIRE AND CHALLENGE OF JUROR BRANSCOMB

In his discussion of the standard of review governing the questioning and retention of
juror Brent Branscomb, Sharapata has summarily dismissed the relevancy of the abuse of
discretion standard of review governing a party's submission of voir dire questions. Brief of
Defendant-Appellee at 1 n. 1. The same argument resurfaces later in the brief, where Sharapata
contends that Stock Rasmussen "admitted" that the trial court acted properly with respect to the
voir dire of juror Branscomb, and thus the propriety of the trial court's subsequent questioning
of Branscomb is undisputed. Id. at 9.
In making such a contention, Sharapata fundamentally misunderstands Stock Rasmussen's
argument. That argument is divided into two prongs:
(1) The trial court should have permitted more liberal questioning of Mr.
Branscomb, in harmony with the principles of Evans v. Doty. 824 P.2d 460
(Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied. 836 P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992), and Barrett v.
1

Peterson. 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Should issue (1) be testiiIIvni111 in ShiUiipitLi'.s Lit II iln liul
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have granted Stock Rasmussen's motion for a new trial based on the information
Stock Rasmussen gleaned in the limited voir dire.
Sharapata has deemed "irrelevant" and undisputed issue (1), an issue consuming five
pages of Stock Rasmussen's brief. It is not irrelevant. Sharapata may have concluded that it
v, "as: inelevant because his understanding of "voir dire" encompasses only those questions asked
before impanelling, not after. Stock Rasmussen has contended that while Evans and Barrett deal

extends to questions asked after impanelling when new information requires that those questions
be asked (as here). Ii i 1:1 le pi e ii i lpai lellii ig \ c ii • :iii e 1:1 ic ti la 1 ::
behind Evans and Barrett. That understanding, however, did not carry *

into its questioning

of juror Branscomb. Stock Rasmussen was hobbled by I lit tnal com I in Hi it ii|in,«-liuniiiiiii|»t .uul
this was an abuse of discretion.
With respect to Sharapata's lengthy treatment of whether Stock Rasmussen could have
struck (iii'oi" BraiiuYtfiib lin i.msi1, SlMiit[t;tla lias failed to point out that the trial court's failure
to allow I he von dire requested would have revealed the information needed to determine
\dinln i llraiiM nmh
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selection process is divided into two phases:
such information to demonstrate a proper cl lal l<
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^formation is gathered; (2) counsel may use
i

the juror.
Interference with the first phase-gathering information-constitutes reversible error, as

Evans and Barrett have demonstrated. If the initial information-gathering is interfered with, how
may a record for appeal be prepared to demonstrate that the juror should have been removed for
cause? An unsatisfying response to such a query produced the results in Evans and Barrett, and
that is why those cases do not concern themselves with whether the contemplated challenges in
those cases would have been for cause or not. Interference with the initial gathering itself is
sufficient to warrant reversal,1 a point underscored by Barrett in its statement that voir dire
illuminates information crucial to both for-cause and peremptory challenges. Barrett. 868 P.2d
at 98. Indeed, the court stated "'the fairness of the trial may depend on the right of counsel to
ask voir dire questions designed to discover attitudes and biases, both conscious and
subconscious, even though they "would not have supported a challenge for cause."'" Id.
(quoting State v. Worthen. 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988)(quoting State v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055,
1060 (Utah 1984)))(emphasis original).

This point is lost on Sharapata, both in his

understanding of applicable law and his characterization of Stock Rasmussen's "main contention"
as being the propriety of challenge rather than the error of refusing liberal voir dire. He has
attempted to mislead this court by emphasizing the issue of whether Stock Rasmussen's challenge
would have been for cause (issue (2) above) while ignoring the threshold issue of whether

1

In this case, a mistrial should have been granted, but it was not. This illustrates a
practical difference between voir dire errors committed before impanelling and those made
after: before impanelling a party may complain that the trial court abused its discretion in
refusing to allow certain questions, and this issue will be preserved for appeal. When a juror
comes forward with previously undivulged information after impanelling, as here, it is
appropriate for counsel to move for a mistrial based on the fact that a juror will be
impanelled about which insufficient information has been obtained. An appeal may then be
taken from the denial of the motion for a mistrial. A practical and effective way to avoid
mistrials in such instances would be to require that an alternate juror always be available.
3

enough information was ever gathered to exercise any kind of challenge (issue (1) above). The
questions are different, and Sharapata's attempt to mix them is simply wrong.

H. INCONSISTENT JURY VERDICT

Sharapata claims that there is "abundant evidence which shows that the Plaintiff herself
was negligent and that this negligence was the proximate cause of her injuries." Brief of
Defendant-Appellee at 20. Had the jury indicated that Stock Rasmussen was the proximate cause
of the accident, this might have been true. But the jury did not so find. Sharapata now asks
this Court to speculate that the jury may have had grounds to find that Stock Rasmussen was the
proximate cause of the accident, notwithstanding a blank space in the special verdict form where
the jury could (and should) have made its analysis of the accident crystal clear. Sharapata
muddles the issue with discussion of "last clear chance", a doctrine he recognizes is no longer
viable in Utah with the advent of comparative negligence analysis. Emphasizing, as one should,
the meat of such analysis, one is compelled to follow this line of reasoning:

(1) Sharapata was found negligent by the jury.
(2) That negligence took the form of either a failure to keep a proper lookout, or
a failure to yield.
(3) Stock Rasmussen was found negligent by the jury.
(4) Evidence adduced at trial demonstrates that comparative negligence could not
have taken the form of anything but failure to use a headlamp.

(5) Negligence predicated on a failure to keep a lookout or failure to yield
presupposes the victim's visibility.
(6) Thus, Stock Rasmussen must have been visible despite her failure to use a
headlamp.
(7) Thus, Stock Rasmussen's negligence could not have been a proximate cause
of the accident.

Sharapata has introduced contentions that are simply inapposite: no evidence as to any
other type of comparative negligence was presented to the jury. Sharapata may argue to this
Court any variety of theory on which to base Stock Rasmussen's liability, but such arguments
must fall on deaf ears given the record below.
Sharapata cites the general (and accurate) proposition enunciated in Bennion v. LeGrand
Johnson Construction Co.. 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), that there is nothing incongruous with
a jury finding a party negligent but not the proximate cause of injury. Sharapata's blanket
citation of this rule betrays his failure to appreciate that in this case, as noted above, there is a
glaring incongruity with a failure to find proximate cause. Bennion is thus distinguishable on
its facts.
A final note as to the marshalling requirement. Stock Rasmussen has clearly stated her
position as to this requirement in her brief. Based on that statement, it is clear that she is not
only well attuned to those requirements, but has even attached, for the Court's convenience, all
relevant portions of the transcript below where any testimony touching on the conduct of either
her or Sharapata was adduced. Even a cursory examination of the reproduced portions of the
5

transcript would illustrate that they favor both sides of this dispute. This is what the marshalling
rule requires. Sharapata has failed to allege with any particularity what portions of the record
are missing. Indeed, every citation to the transcript in Sharapata's brief has been attached to
Stock Rasmussen's brief. Sharapata's argument lacks candor. The marshalling requirement has
been satisfied.

m . PROPRIETY OF CLOSING ARGUMENT

Sharapata contends that the standard of review cited by Stock Rasmussen with respect
to this issue is once again "irrelevant," admissibility not being at issue. Defendant-Appellee's
Brief at 3 n.2. To the contrary, admissibility is a key issue, for in passing on the propriety of
Sharapata's closing argument, this Court must consider the inadmissibility of the evidence
referred to. Sharapata's further contentions are addressed by the authority cited by Stock
Rasmussen in her initial brief.

IV. ERROR IN FOUNDATIONAL OBJECTIONS

Sharapata contends that Stock Rasmussen has misstated the standard of review concerning
foundational objections. This is not true. The footnote cited in State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774
(Utah 1991), clearly stated that questions of admissibility are ultimately reviewed for
correctness. Stock Rasmussen submits that questions of foundation are questions of admissibility
for purposes of determining the proper standard of review: a court is ultimately required to
6

review the proper application of legal principles underlying a foundational ruling in the same
manner it reviews the legal principles underlying a ruling on admissibility.
The contention that Stock Rasmussen has not sufficiently identified which evidentiary
rulings she has objected to is unfounded. In her brief Stock Rasmussen specifically contends
that she is appealing from foundational objections overruled at trial, and then cites the pages on
which those objections occurred. No ambiguity or lack of specificity has resulted from this
approach.
DATED this J

day of August, 1994.

PHILLIPS. LOWRY
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
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